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The Influence of Private Contractual 
Failure on Regulation: 
The Case of Oil Field Unitization 
Gary D. Libecap 
University of Arizona 
Steven N. Wiggins 
Texas A&M University 
This article analyzes the interdependence between regulation and 
private contractual failure. The analysis reveals that the feasible 
range of regulation is restricted by the same forces that block private 
agreement. The focus of the study is oil field unitization regulation 
in Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming (federal lands) from 1948 
through 1975. Despite large potential gains from unitization, private 
negotiations fail because of lease heterogeneities and information 
problems regarding lease value estimates. In response, the federal 
and state governments have adopted strikingly different policies to 
encourage unitization with different results. Only the federal gov- 
ernment's regulations are effective because they surmount informa- 
tion problems. Texas has the least successful regulation. The paper 
argues that the policy differences are due to the political influence of 
small firms that benefit from nonunitized production. 
Virtually all domestic reservoirs involve multiple own- 
ership, often by persons with different aims and objec- 
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tives. History shows plainly how difficult it has been (in 
fact, impossible in some cases) to get a group of such 
owners to agree on a single course of action in produc- 
ing a given reservoir. And yet, it is absolutely basic that a 
reservoir should be handled as a unit operation in order 
to achieve maximum oil recovery from it. [Oil and Gas 
Journal, September 17, 1962] 
I. Introduction 
Among economists there is general appreciation that transactions 
costs restrict private contracting, particularly where parties are 
heterogeneous, information is asymmetric, or there is a need to se- 
quentially adjust contractual terms (Coase 1960; Meade 1971; Wil- 
liamson 1984). Correspondingly, if private agreements fail under ex- 
isting institutions, new institutional forms are developed to facilitate 
exchange.' Davis and North (1971) use this argument to explain the 
emergence of various institutions, as do Alchian and Demsetz (1973) 
and Libecap (1978) to explain the adoption of particular property 
rights arrangements. Similarly, certain regulatory policies can be 
viewed as an effort to reduce transactions costs, which Goldberg 
(1976) and Williamson (1976) argue must be understood to explain 
why regulation emerges in particular forms. 
This article examines the link between private contracting and reg- 
ulation from another direction. It analyzes the interdependence be- 
tween regulatory responses and a breakdown in private contracting. 
The analysis reveals how the feasible range of regulations is restricted 
by the same forces that restrict private contracting. The endogeneity 
of regulation means that if consensus cannot be reached privately, 
there is no guarantee that regulations to facilitate agreement will be 
forthcoming because parties will oppose regulatory policies that 
weaken their bargaining position. This case study of oil field unitiza- 
tion provides insight into both the determination of particular regula- 
tory arrangements and their impact on contracting success. 
Wiggins and Libecap (1985) show that private negotiation for uniti- 
zation generally fails and that the primary cause of contractual failure 
is asymmetrical information across bargaining parties regarding rela- 
tive oil lease values. Faced with unsuccessful private efforts to unitize 
oil fields to reduce rent dissipation, the federal and state governments 
have adopted strikingly different regulatory policies to encourage 
unitization, with correspondingly different results. Here we examine 
' The notion that economic agents influence regulatory policies is discussed exten- 
sively elsewhere (see Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Johnson and Libecap 1982). 
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the differing unitization policies of the federal government, Okla- 
homa, and Texas. We also examine how the political influence of 
parties opposed to unitization in private bargaining crucially affected 
the types of regulations adopted. 
Of the three, federal policy is the most effective in promoting uniti- 
zation because it encourages contracting during exploration rather 
than after field development. Our analysis reveals that the stage of oil 
production in which bargaining occurs is critical for contracting suc- 
cess. During exploration, there is little asymmetric information across 
bargaining parties regarding relative lease values to block agreement. 
On the other hand, with field development differential information 
about lease productivity emerges, and disputes arise over lease value 
and unit shares. This finding is significant for Oklahoma and Texas 
because, in contrast to the federal government, those states allow for 
unitization only after oil fields have been discovered and fully devel- 
oped. In Oklahoma, these problems are partially mitigated by regula- 
tions that permit 63 percent of the parties to coerce other firms to join 
the unit. In Texas, however, unanimous agreement is required. 
Negotiations in this contracting setting then are most effective when 
completed behind a veil of ignorance during exploration before de- 
velopment reveals differential information regarding lease values. 
Wyoming is largely federal land, and we show that it has a much 
higher proportion of unitized production than Oklahoma or Texas, 
and that Oklahoma has a greater share than Texas. 
The observed policy differences across the three jurisdictions are 
due to variation in the number and political strength of firms opposed 
to private unitization. The study reveals that the same firms that resist 
private unitization agreements also oppose government policies to 
promote unit contracts. The ability of these firms to block effective 
policies, despite large aggregate gains from unitization, has broad 
implications: where private negotiations become mired in dispute, 
political consensus on effective regulatory policies to complete con- 
tracts may be difficult to achieve. Accordingly, regulations that im- 
prove efficiency may not emerge.2 
Section II describes the gains from unitization and the general 
contracting problem facing firms attempting to unitize oil fields pri- 
vately. Section III describes policy differences in Wyoming, Okla- 
homa, and Texas and examines their impact on the extent and nature 
of unitization. Section IV links private contracting problems to the 
political environment for unitization regulation. Section V discusses 
the general problem of improving resource allocation when there are 
important heterogeneities and informational uncertainties. 
2 This qualifies the more optimistic notions of Davis and North (1971). North (1981) 
has returned to the question why inefficient institutions persist. 
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II. Contracting for Unitization Agreement 
A. The Gains from Unitization 
The production of crude oil displays classic common-property condi- 
tions, because of dispersed surface ownership above oil reservoirs, the 
U.S. policy of reserving mineral rights to surface landowners, and the 
rule of capture. Landowners grant firms access to the reservoir 
through leases. Since oil is migratory and the rule of capture assigns 
property rights only on extraction, each firm has an incentive to drill 
and drain competitively. The result is excessive wells and rapid ex- 
traction rates, leading to premature depletion of natural subsurface 
pressure. With loss of pressure the natural gas dissolved in the oil 
comes out of solution, reducing the oil's mobility and leaving 
significant reserves permanently trapped. The oil that retains some 
mobility must be artificially lifted at high marginal extraction costs.3 
Fieldwide unitization is the most complete solution to this problem. 
Under unitization production rights are delegated through negotia- 
tion to a single firm, the unit operator, with net revenues apportioned 
among all parties on the field (including those that would otherwise 
be producing). The operator has an incentive to maximize field rents, 
sharply curtailing rent dissipation. Unitization results in important 
economic gains: a time stream of output that more closely approxi- 
mates the rent-maximizing pattern, increased oil recovery, and re- 
duced wells and other capital costs.4 
One can classify oil fields by their natural drive mechanism that 
forces oil to the surface: gravity, water, and natural gas. While unitiza- 
tion increases production in all types of oil fields, the output effects 
are particularly important for dissolved gas and gas condensate fields, 
common in all three states. Gas is dissolved in petroleum or is in liquid 
form under high pressure in such fields. If development proceeds too 
rapidly through competitive drilling, subsurface pressures drop, and 
gas goes out of solution (in dissolved gas fields) or vaporizes (in gas 
condensate fields). Then, because gas is lighter and travels more 
quickly than oil, it is expelled first, leading to a too-rapid decline in 
subsurface pressure per barrel of oil produced.5 As gas is drawn off in 
' Discussion of rent dissipation is provided in Libecap and Wiggins (1984). 
4 Measures of any increase in rents due to changes in the time pattern of production 
are not available, since output was restricted in Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming by 
state prorationing rules. Because unitization increased the production potential of the 
affected fields, state agencies, such as the Texas Railroad Commission, were faced with 
a reallocation problem. With a fixed state production target, any increase in allowed 
ouput from newly unitized fields under the prorationing rules would require a corre- 
sponding reduction elsewhere. Reaction from potential losers to proposed output re- 
allocation was sharp. As a result, the agencies tended to limit the increase to any unit. 
See, e.g., Oil and Gas Journal (January 7, 1957; June 17, 1957). 
5 For example, on the Kelly-Snyder field in Texas extraction on numerous leases 
between 1947 and 1952 led to a 46 percent drop in subsurface pressure from 3,122 
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condensate fields, it clogs pore spaces in the reservoir, permanently 
trapping large quantities of oil. Oil also becomes more viscous and 
requires more pressure to move it. This results in the premature need 
for artificial pumping or reinjection of water or gas to drive the oil to 
the surface, which causes sharply higher marginal extraction costs 
than if pressures had been maintained.6 Oil Weekly (April 13, 1942; 
May 3, 1943) estimated that early unitization of solution gas fields 
would increase recovery from two to five times that of unconstrained 
production. Similarly, on the Fairway field in Texas it was predicted 
that unitization would increase oil recovery by 130,000,000 barrels 
(Oil and Gas Journal, December 7, 1964). 
Where complete fieldwide agreement fails, smaller subunits are 
possible. The gains from complete relative to incomplete units, how- 
ever, are still significant. Oil and GasJournal (June 17, 1957) estimated 
44 percent recovery of original oil in place for fully unitized fields, 
compared with 39 percent for partially unitized fields. For a small, 
100,000,000-barrel reservoir the undiscounted difference in output 
values in 1957 was over $15,000,000. The potential cost savings from 
unitization are also indicated by redundant well drilling under com- 
petitive production. As of 1937 the American Petroleum Institute 
estimated that unnecessary wells on East Texas alone cost over 
$200,000,000 (American Bar Assoc. 1938, p. 256). As we show in 
Section IV, dense drilling continued for 40 more years in East Texas. 
Even where fields are partially unitized, capital costs are increased. 
For instance, efforts to completely unitize the 71,000-acre Slaughter 
field of west Texas failed, and ultimately 28 separate subunits or 
operating areas were established, ranging from 80 to 4,380 acres. To 
prevent migration of oil across subunit boundaries some 427 offset- 
ting water injection wells were sunk along each unit boundary at a cost 
per well of approximately $360,000, for a total of $156,000,000.7 
These wells and related expenses were unneeded for production. 
psi to 1,675 psi and a corresponding rise in gas/oil ratios from 870 cu ft per barrel to 
1,163 cu ft per barrel. This drop in pressure brought concern about the viability of the 
Kelly-Snyder field, one of the largest in the state (Oil and Gas Journal, October 27, 
1952). 
6 There was a rush to unitize the gas condensate Knox-Bromide field in Texas before 
gas pressures fell below dew (solution) point. The potential problem of viscous oil was 
emphasized: "Once the liquid clogged the sand near the well bore, there would be no 
practical way to unclog it" (Oil and Gas Journal, March 26, 1962). 
7 Increased well costs on the Slaughter field of Texas were calculated by counting the 
otherwise unnecessary injection wells along unit boundaries as shown on Slaughter 
field maps (August 22, 1967, company records, Houston, Slaughter Western RKM unit 
file). Costs per well are from company records, Slaughter estate unit file. We were 
granted access to the unitization files of one of the largest producing firms in Texas. 
Confidentiality was requested by the company. Copies of the relevant documentation 
can be obtained from the authors. 
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Such practices were routine, particularly in Texas where multiple 
units were common (see, e.g., Oil and GasJournal, July 9, 1956; March 
1, 1965). 
Aggregate data reveal additional evidence of the higher capital 
costs from failure to unitize in the United States. Unitization is com- 
mon only on federal lands, and, as a result, in 1980 the United States 
had 88 percent of the world's active wells, but only 14 percent of 
world production. Moreover, U.S. wells produced only an average of 
16 barrels per day, the lowest of the 53 countries for which data are 
available. Canada's wells, by contrast, averaged 71 barrels per day, 
Venezuela's 426, and Saudi Arabia's 13,124 (International Petroleum 
Encyclopedia 1982, pp. 334-35). With these potential gains from uniti- 
zation in mind, we examine the contracting problem faced by firms in 
reaching unit agreements. 
B. Unitization Contracting Issues 
The central issue in unitization contracting is agreement on an alloca- 
tion formula for assigning unit revenues and costs among firms. 
Shares are based on estimates of each lease's contribution to the unit. 
In negotiations two serious problems arise: first, unitization contracts 
must assign once-and-for-all shares at the time the contract is com- 
pleted; and second, general uncertainty and asymmetrical informa- 
tion regarding relative lease values block consensus on value estimates 
that determine unit shares. 
Once-and-for-all unit shares form a permanent allocation rule, 
agreed to at the time the unit contract is completed, based on 
preunitization estimates of relative lease value. Our analysis of uniti- 
zation in Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming from 1948 through 1975 
reveals that contingent updates of unit shares after the unit is operat- 
ing do not occur. This is because changes in reservoir dynamics and 
field production after unitization make it generally impossible to de- 
termine the lease from which the oil originated or the lease from 
which it would have been produced without unitization. Such deter- 
mination is a prerequisite for any revision of lease value estimates and 
the corresponding unit shares. Before a field is unitized, extraction 
occurs from each productive lease, but after unitization, the produc- 
tion pattern is fundamentally altered. The field becomes the produc- 
ing unit, not the lease, and wells are placed to maximize aggregate 
field returns. Many existing wells are plugged or used solely for injec- 
tion of water, natural gas, or other substances to drive the oil to the 
unit's producing wells. These policies change the flow of oil migration 
in the reservoir, and the lease as a producing unit loses its signifi- 
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cance. Postunitization production, then, cannot be used to infer rela- 
tive lease values. 
While preunitization lease values determine unit shares, informa- 
tion problems block consensus on the estimates. The level of informa- 
tion depends on the stage of production in which contracting occurs. 
Adelman (1972, pp. 20-36) develops the crucial distinction between 
exploration and field development and the information available to 
firms at each stage. In exploration little is known regarding the loca- 
tion of oil and its commercial extraction possibilities. At that time all 
leases are relatively homogeneous, and unitization agreements are 
comparatively easy to reach, using simple allocation formulas. Since 
no party knows whether the formula is to its particular advantage or 
disadvantage, negotiators can focus on the aggregate gains from 
unitization. Information problems and distributional concerns, how- 
ever, arise with development as reserves are proved and expanded. 
With the initial discovery well and the drilling of subsequent wells, 
lease heterogeneities emerge. Reservoirs are not uniform, and the 
information released from a well is descriptive of only the immediate 
vicinity. Hence, through drilling their individual leases, firms gain 
knowledge of their portion of the reservoir; the full extent of the 
deposit and the productive potential of other areas will be revealed 
only through the drilling activities of other firms. 
The production potential and commercial value of a lease are a 
function of objective variables such as the number of wells and cur- 
rent and past production as well as subjective geological variables, 
including the amount of oil below lease lines, net oil migration, oil 
viscosity, permeability of the surrounding medium, and subsurface 
pressure. These latter variables are the source of contracting prob- 
lems. Information about them and their significance for lease value 
estimations depend critically on subjective interpretation by company 
engineers and nonverifiable company records. While it is difficult to 
achieve consensus among firms on the implications of such informa- 
tion for lease value, it is nonetheless used by each firm to form private 
value estimates. The resulting asymmetry in lease value calculations, 
based on differential information and interpretation among firms, is 
the primary cause of breakdown in unit share negotiations. 
The estimation of static reservoir characteristics such as thickness 
and porosity illustrates the information problems involved. Each cal- 
culation is based on only a small number of observations at well bores. 
The interpolation of reservoir structure between wells, however, is 
sensitive to the specific functional forms employed by company en- 
gineers. Procedures and estimates vary across firms. For instance, in 
unit negotiations on the Prentice field in west Texas there were differ- 
ences in porosity estimates of 60-100 percent. Such disparities helped 
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to delay unit agreement for 9 years (letter, December 11, 1962, Pren- 
tice N.E. unit file, company records). The estimation of dynamic res- 
ervoir characteristics, such as remaining oil reserves, involves even 
greater complications. 
In addition to the problems of estimating static and dynamic 
geological characteristics, firms have proprietary information that af- 
fects value estimates. Lease production is influenced by firm manage- 
ment policies, details of which are available only from company rec- 
ords. While they are available to the firm's engineers and geologists, 
they can be easily misrepresented and may not be considered reliable 
by other firms. Thus, there are important differences in the data and 
lease values privately assembled and calculated by individual firms 
and those publicly available for unit negotiations. These differences 
inhibit agreement between the lease owner and other firms on unit 
shares. 
If private information indicates that estimates of lease values, based 
on public information, are too low, the firm may not join. If the firm 
expects future production data to confirm its private value estimates 
and if its gain in unit share offsets its portion of reservoir damage 
from delay, the firm will not join. While one can hypothesize a host of 
solutions to these information problems, in practice they do not ap- 
pear. Our analysis of unitization contracting from 1948 to 1975 re- 
veals that information problems repeatedly stalled negotiations, sug- 
gesting that there were only limited means of eliciting agreement. In 
addition to these information issues, the firm may also decide to delay 
joining, if it can obtain concessions from other parties by holding out. 
In the meantime, nonunitized production shares are determined by 
relative lease production capabilities, subject to constraints imposed 
by regulatory authorities. 
The central factor affecting the probability of withholding leases in 
anticipation of subsequent share increases is uncertainty regarding 
the public estimates of lease value used to assign unit shares. One can 
think of such estimates as a Bayesian prior that is updated by private 
information and private assessment of public information. If there is 
great uncertainty about public estimates, the Bayesian prior is held 
less strongly, making it more likely that private information or private 
assessment of public information will lead to divergence in public and 
private lease value estimates. Owners of leases with highly uncertain 
public value estimates will strongly prefer to join if their private infor- 
mation is unfavorable. However, if private value estimates exceed 
public estimates, leading to an expected share revision large enough 
to offset reservoir losses, then the firm will prefer to delay unit forma- 
tion. 
The most productive, longest-lived leases on a field are most apt to 
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be withheld because they have the greatest uncertainty regarding 
value. Those leases are more subject to future changes in subsurface 
conditions and, accordingly, have greater variance in lease value esti- 
mates and a higher probability of large divergence between public 
and private values.8 Firm size, however, also affects the decision to 
withhold productive leases from the unit. For firms with large field 
holdings the gains from delay on one lease are likely to be offset by 
losses on others, reducing the probability that delay will bring a 
sufficiently large increase in rental share to offset field damage from 
delay. For small firms with limited field acreage, these aggregate ef- 
fects are largely external, so they are more likely to withhold their 
highly productive leases, which have high variance in value estimates. 
Differences in lease value estimates also block consensus on side pay- 
ments to draw potential holdouts into agreement because all firms 
have incentives to claim favorable private information. 
These information problems decline over time as more public and 
private information is released through development and expected 
lease lives shorten; uncertainty about lease values is reduced, and 
estimates collapse around true parameter values. At that point con- 
sensus on fieldwide units becomes more likely. Empirically, we ob- 
serve that private units are typically agreed to late in field develop- 
ment. 
Besides the information issues that particularly affect the owners of 
small, productive leases, we also show below that small firms had 
other reasons for opposing unitization. Small lease owners were given 
preferential drilling permits by regulatory authorities. Those policies 
allowed such leases to be more densely drilled than larger leases, and 
with more wells per acre, small lease owners could drain neighboring 
areas. In unit negotiations such lease owners insisted on protecting 
their regulation-imposed advantage as a condition for joining. 
These information and holdout problems suggest that unanimous 
agreement for early unitization, when aggregate gains are largest, will 
be uncommon once development has begun and asymmetric infor- 
mation has been released. If only a few firms do not join, a partial unit 
can be voluntarily created, but this significantly reduces aggregate 
gains compared to a fieldwide unit. A minimum threshold of leases 
must join before a unit can be effective. For firms with numerous 
leases and significant acreage in a field, this threshold requirement 
offsets the incentive to withhold productive leases. Since large firms 
internalize a greater proportion of the aggregate gains from early 
8 General contracting issues and the increased residual variance associated with value 
estimates for highly productive leases are discussed in detail in Wiggins and Libecap 
(1985). 
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unitization, they are motivated to expedite agreement by placing all of 
their leases into the unit. Small firms with limited acreage, on the 
other hand, will hold out. 
A number of implications follow from this discussion: (i) Leases 
with the greatest uncertainty regarding value will be more likely to 
desire a delay in unit formation, and these leases tend to be the most 
productive on a field. (ii) Large firms with diversified lease holdings 
on a field will be less likely to delay unit formation, ceteris paribus. (iii) 
Small firms with limited, very productive leases, on the other hand, 
are more likely to oppose unitization. (iv) Voluntary, private unit 
agreement will come late in field life. Here, we use these implications 
for analyzing the impact of private contracting problems on govern- 
ment policy. Since there are clear efficiency gains from unitization 
and major obstacles to private agreement, there is a potential role for 
regulatory policy to complete unit contracts. The discussion above, 
however, shows that the same parties that delay private agreement 
also have an incentive to oppose regulations that promote unitization. 
III. Regulatory Policies, Their Impact, and 
Political Sources 
A. Policies in Different Jurisdictions 
Of all unitization policies, those adopted by the federal government 
toward federal lands are by far the most successful. All private pro- 
duction rights on federal lands are assigned through the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 as amended (30 U.S.C., secs. 181-287). Firms 
can obtain leases for up to 20 years under that law, but the aggregate 
leased acreage held by a firm cannot exceed 246,080 acres in any 
state. If firms agree to unitize their leases, however, the leases are 
automatically extended for the life of the unit and are exempt from 
the statutory acreage limit (30 U.S.C., sec. 226[]). Unit plans are 
approved and actively monitored by the Bureau of Land Manage- 
ment. 
On federal lands unitization typically occurs as follows. First, a po- 
tentially productive geological formation is identified and the overly- 
ing acreage is unitized for exploration, usually within 6 months. Once 
unitized, prospecting occurs with costs and returns allocated among 
the unit parties according to leased acreage, since subsurface charac- 
teristics are not yet known. As oil is discovered, the proven areas are 
separated from unproven areas by the bureau. Leases in proven 
areas, called participating areas (PAs), share in the returns from the 
unit on an acreage basis. Leases in unproven areas do not share until 
their area is proven to have commercial reserves, reducing the hazard 
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to holders of potentially rich leases of rent transfers to less productive 
leases. The PAs can be expanded or contracted as new production 
information appears, and the unit is collapsed around the PA when 
the productive limits of the field have been determined. The unit 
remains intact through primary production, when output is from 
natural subsurface pressure, and continues through secondary recov- 
ery, when injection of gas or water is necessary to stimulate output. A 
majority rule is used in forming units. The unit operator must drill 
throughout the exploratory unit. Firms that believe their leases are 
neglected can drill wells, demand inclusion in the PA if recoverable 
oil is found, and receive reimbursement for a multiple of their drill- 
ing costs.9 
Since federal policy encourages early exploratory units before com- 
mercial petroleum deposits have been found, it allows for large po- 
tential gains from unitization. Early units can restrict the total number 
of wells drilled and control the pace of production. The allocation 
arrangements are preset early in field development before informa- 
tion uncertainties and asymmetries appear regarding the interpreta- 
tion of particular lease characteristics. During exploration very little is 
known regarding subsurface conditions, and individual bargaining 
positions are relatively homogeneous. This is the key policy that sepa- 
rates federal regulation from practices in Oklahoma and Texas. 
It is important to note that on older federal fields not unitized prior 
to development, unitization negotiations are protracted and fre- 
quently break down in the same way as in Oklahoma and Texas, even 
though the acreage exemptions still apply. Negotiations are smooth 
only with exploratory units.10 Hence, information uncertainties and 
asymmetries are the primary sources of contractual failure in unitiza- 
tion. While we do not model agency behavior, there is clear motiva- 
tion for federal policy to encourage unitization. As the principal land- 
owner in areas where its regulations apply, the federal government 
captures a significant share of the increased field rents that result 
from efficient development. It receives both cash bonuses and royal- 
ties from its leases to private firms, and that income stream would rise 
if field values increased. 
' Data on federal policy are based on interviews with Bureau of Land Management 
personnel, North Central Region, Casper, Wyoming. 
10 Lists of Wyoming units were assembled using data from the Bureau of Land 
Management, Casper; the Interstate Oil Compact Commission (1960, 1962); and the 
International Oil Scouts Association (1948-75). From these sources unitized and field 
discovery dates can be compared. Only on old fields, typically discovered prior to 1940, 
do discovery dates precede unitization. For example, the Salt Creek field, Wyoming's 
largest, was discovered in 1917 and was not unitized until 1939. Examination of bureau 
unitization files for such fields reveals the same negotiation problems encountered in 
Texas and Oklahoma fields. 
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Oklahoma has a compulsory unitization statute. The law allows the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission to force all leaseholders on a 
reservoir into a unit if 63 percent of the operators (weighted by acre- 
age) agree to unitization (1945 Oklahoma Sess. Laws at 162; 1951 
Oklahoma Sess. Laws at 136). Significantly, Oklahoma law requires 
that units cover only proven acreage in developed fields, a require- 
ment that effectively rules out early unitization. Accordingly, infor- 
mation uncertainties and individual bargaining positions are estab- 
lished prior to unit negotiation. The Corporation Commission has 
less motivation than the federal Bureau of Land Management to ac- 
tively monitor units to encourage early unitization.11 Oklahoma lands 
are private, and the state government does not directly share in in- 
creased field rents (royalties). 
Of all major producing states only Texas adheres to a unanimity 
rule in forming units. Texas law also requires that units cover only 
developed acreage, so there are no early units. In Texas, units are 
typically formed only late in field development when artificial injec- 
tion becomes necessary (Oil and GasJournal, April 20, 1959). Owing to 
the problem of reaching unanimous agreement after information 
asymmetries have developed, the Railroad Commission commonly 
approves subunits written around nonjoiners. Because most oil lands 
are private, the Railroad Commission's motivation for regulation par- 
allels that of the Corporation Commission.12 
B. The Impact of Regulatory Differences 
Table 1 summarizes the pattern of unitization in Oklahoma, Texas, 
and Wyoming between 1948 and 1975. 3 These data indicate sharp 
differences in the extent of unitization across the three states. Wyo- 
" Oklahoma and Texas both have severance taxes on the value of production, but 
this does not provide the same regulatory motivation as the federal government's 
royalty interest. 
12 Texas antitrust laws effectively made unitization illegal until 1949 (Hardwicke 
1948, p. 57). 
13 A list of units in Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming was compiled from records of 
the Texas Railroad Commission, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the Bureau 
of Land Management, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, and the 
Interstate Oil Compact Commission. Because we are interested only in fieldwide units, 
we culled partial units from the data. That is a problem only in Texas. Partial units were 
identified by locating multiple unit entries per field on Texas Railroad Commission unit 
lists. The International Oil Scouts list annual output by field by state. Accordingly, we 
matched field output with the compiled fieldwide unit list to calculate total unitized 
production. The data were then presented as a share of total annual state production. 
Caution, though, is necessary because unit names and field names do not always coin- 
cide, particularly in Oklahoma. In those cases it was difficult to assign production to the 
units, since production data are by field. Accordingly, it is possible that the Oklahoma 
unit share for some years is too low. 
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TABLE 1 
PRODUCTION FOR FIELDWIDE UNITS AS A SHARE OF TOTAL STATE OUTPUT (%) 
Year Wyoming Oklahoma Texas 
1948 58 9 0 
1949 56 9 0 
1950 51 10 1 
1951 53 11 2 
1952 64 15 2 
1953 54 15 2 
1954 48 16 4 
1955 55 25 4 
1956 57 26 4 
1957 69 26 5 
1958 71 22 5 
1959 65 18 6 
1960 64 24 7 
1961 71 28 11 
1962 76 27 11 
1963 75 33 11 
1964 70 28 11 
1965 70 30 16 
1966 74 31 18 
1967 73 35 16 
1968 74 31 12 
1969 69 35 11 
1970 67 35 14 
1971 72 35 14 
1972 83 34 16 
1973 84 35 17 
1974 85 34 19 
1975 82 38 20 
SOURCE.-Lists of unitized fields in Wyoming, Oklahoma, and Texas were compiled from files at the Texas 
Railroad Commission; the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission; the Bureau of Land Management, 
North Central Region Office; and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. Output data are from the International 
Oil Scouts Association, International Oil and Gas Development Yearbook. 
ming had 50 percent of its production from fieldwide units as early as 
1948, the Oklahoma share was 9 percent, and Texas had no fully 
unitized production. While the Oklahoma share remains well below 
that of Wyoming, it is larger than the share in Texas through 1975. 
These raw data, however, are influenced by a number of other fac- 
tors, such as the stage of depletion of a state's fields and their size. As 
fields age and primary production becomes depleted, differences in 
public and private estimates of lease values converge to true values. 
Thus, disputes about values decline and negotiations can be com- 
pleted. Hence, unitization should become more widespread as fields 
become depleted. Unfortunately, data on the stage of individual res- 
ervoir depletion are not generally available. The aggregate stage of 
depletion of reservoirs in a state, however, can be indicated by the 
ratio of cumulative production in the state to cumulative production 
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plus remaining estimated reserves (American Petroleum Inst. 1977) 
Initially, this ratio will be zero, and as the state's reservoirs age, it will 
approach one. Average reservoir size in a state also influences unitiza- 
tion, since large reservoirs tend to have more heterogeneities across 
leases and a greater number of producing firms; both should retard 
agreement. The best available aggregate measure of size is average 
output per field in each state. 
In general, unitization policies in each of the three states will affect 
the impact of these variables on the extent of unitization. Texas, 
which has no compulsory unitization law, can be used as a benchmark. 
In Texas, small changes in field size should not create significant 
differences in the extent of unitization because of the constraints of 
the unanimity rule. When field sizes are large, as in Texas, small size 
changes will not reduce the number of operators sufficiently to bring 
agreement. Depletion of production, on the other hand, should be a 
more important determinant of unitization. When an individual field 
reaches depletion, operators have an incentive to unitize. Oklahoma's 
law, which does not require unanimity, should substantially alter both 
of these relationships. As field sizes decline it becomes more likely 
that the required 63 percent agreement will be reached. Similarly, 
since depletion is not uniform across a field, only 63 percent of the 
leases must be depleted before agreement can be reached. The im- 
pact of the size and depletion variables in Wyoming is less clear be- 
cause of federal policy to encourage unitization at exploration. Since a 
large percentage of production is unitized prior to development, de- 
pletion may be less important than in Texas. Nevertheless, federal 
policy does include compulsion, which should increase the impact of 
depletion. Early unitization should also reduce the impact of field size 
in agreement. For the intercept variable, as defined in equation (1), 
the difference between Wyoming and Texas, however, is clear. The 
ability to form exploratory units before information asymmetries 
should lead to a greater share of unitized production independent of 
either depletion or field size. 
We use a simple regression model to test these hypotheses and 
measure the impact of regulatory policies on differences in the extent 
of unitization. Let 
Yit = Po + PI3SIZE-t + P2DEP-t + 13WYO + P4WYODEP.I 
? r35WYOSIZEit + 360K + f37OKDEP-t (1) 
? i38OKSIZE-t + E-ts 
where Yit = proportion of state i production from fully unitized fields 
in year t; SIZE-t = average field output in state i in year t; DEP1t = 
cumulative production/cumulative production + remaining reserves 
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for state i in year t; WYO = Wyoming intercept dummy; OK = 
Oklahoma intercept dummy; and Eft is a randomly distributed error 
term with zero mean and is independent of the independent vari- 
ables. The other variables are obtained by multiplying the respective 
intercept dummies for Wyoming and Oklahoma by their size and 
depletion variables; for example, WYODEP-t = WYO x DEP-t. With 
this format Texas, with the least regulation, becomes the base line, 
and the differential impacts of regulatory policies in Oklahoma and 
Wyoming are shown in the estimated intercept and slope dummies. 
To obtain the point estimate for an Oklahoma variable, for instance, 
add the Oklahoma coefficient to the Texas coefficient. 
The regression was estimated for the period 1948-75, and the 
results and the estimated partial effects of Wyoming and Oklahoma 
policies beyond those of Texas are reported in table 2.14 The 
coefficients are estimated with an autoregressive process to correct for 
autocorrelation.'5 The estimated coefficients for the depletion and 
size variables reported in part A of table 2 generally support the 
hypotheses presented above. In Wyoming, where unitization typically 
occurs during exploration, the field size and depletion dummy 
coefficients are not significant, implying that neither has an impact 
beyond that observed for Texas. The primary effect of federal unit- 
ization policy appears, as hypothesized, in the intercept dummy, 
which is large and significant. The individual dummy coefficients for 
Oklahoma also strongly support the hypotheses. Oklahoma's size 
coefficient is the only one that is statistically significant. The different 
voting rules also affect the impact of depletion in the two states. The 
coefficient for depletion in Texas is 0.64 and is significant (.01 level), 
while the difference between Oklahoma and Texas is 0.91 and is 
highly significant. The point estimate for Oklahoma is 1.55 (0.91 + 
0.64). The overall effects of unitization regulations in Wyoming and 
Oklahoma relative to those in Texas are calculated by multiplying the 
estimated intercept and slope coefficients by selected values for the 
right-hand variables in equation (1) and summing them for each state. 
Part B of table 2 reports those calculations for 1975, the latest period 
for which we have data, and for the sample means. The results indi- 
cate that federal regulation increased the share of unitized produc- 
tion in Wyoming over that in Texas by 59 percent in 1975 and by 58 
14 While the dependent variable is theoretically bounded, only four of the 84 obser- 
vations were on the boundary (the first four observations for Texas). Accordingly, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were used. 
15 Original OLS estimates had a D-W statistic of 1.067, suggesting autocorrelation of 
the residuals. Statistical analysis of the residuals indicated a second-order autoregres- 
sive process. Correction for the autocorrelation was made for the estimations reported 
in table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF IMPACT OF POLICY DIFFERENCES 
A. REGRESSION RESULTS* 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Intercept Depletion Size 
Texas (base line) -31.30 .64 - 1.36E-06 
(11.17) (.15) (8.72E-06) 
Wyoming (dummies) 44.78 .14 1.09E-05 
(21.02) (.22) (2.03E-05) 
Oklahoma (dummies) -56.35 .91 - 1.02E-04 
(23.80) (.28) (2.44E-05) 
B. ESTIMATED PARTIAL EFFECTS OF WYOMING AND OKLAHOMA REGULATION 
1975: 
Wyoming: (3 + r34(WYODEP,975) + r5(WYOSIZE1975) = 59.29 
(3.78) 
Oklahoma: (36 + (7(OKDEPI975) + (38(OKSIZE1975) = 13.82 
(4.02) 
Sample Means: 
Wyoming: 13 + 134(WYODEP) + P5(WYOSIZE) = 58.33 
(2.24) 
Oklahoma: 16 + 137(OKDEP) + f38(OKSIZE) = 37.08 
(3.15) 
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Dependent variable is percentage of state production from fully unitized fields. R2 = .97; F(8, 73) = 546.888; 
t= 1948-75. 
percent using the sample means. Both estimates are significant at the 
.01 level. Regulatory policies in Oklahoma resulted in approximately 
37 percent more unitized production than in Texas on average for 
the sample period and 14 percent more in 1975 (both are significant 
at the .01 level). 
These estimates show consistently larger shares of unitized produc- 
tion in Wyoming than in either Oklahoma or Texas, and they empha- 
size the importance of timing of unit negotiations. Only federal policy 
allows for unitization prior to field development and the emergence 
of information uncertainties and asymmetries that impede contract- 
ing. The estimates also confirm that the 63 percent rule in Oklahoma 
significantly increases the proportion of unitized production over that 
in Texas, where unanimous agreement is required. 
The compulsory rule in Oklahoma and Wyoming should also lead 
to more complete units because holdouts can be forced into agree- 
ment. Texas policy encourages fragmented subunits over reservoirs, 
since compulsion is not possible. The evidence is consistent with the 
implication. While we do not have complete lists of all multiple or 
incomplete units in the three states, available evidence based on a 
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survey of the Oil and Gas Journal from 1950 to 1970 indicates that 
multiple units are characteristic only of Texas. There were feature 
articles on 21 Texas fields, and of those at least 16 had subunits. 16 On 
the other hand, the same survey included lengthy discussions of the 
unitization of six fields in Oklahoma with no reference to multiple 
units.17 For Wyoming, analysis of 25 unit files at the Bureau of Land 
Management and in company records shows no evidence of incom- 
plete or fragmented units.18 The unitization files at the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission provide more comprehensive data on Okla- 
homa's willingness to compel unitization once 63 percent of the lease 
owners agree. A random sample of 261 fields, for which the percent- 
age agreement was reported in Oklahoma Corporation Commission 
files, shows that in 134 cases, 51 percent of the total, there was less 
than 100 percent approval. The percentage agreement for those cases 
ranged from 67 percent to 99 percent. 
IV. The Political Economy of Unitization 
Regulation 
This section examines the reasons for differing unitization policies in 
Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming. The strikingly different regulatory 
policies and results among the jurisdictions shown above provide an 
important case for examining the forces that mold regulation. Of 
particular interest is the fact that there was a clear-cut policy choice to 
enhance economic efficiency, and in Oklahoma and Texas at least, the 
petroleum industry was extremely influential; yet regulations dif- 
fered sharply. This means, then, that the sources of support and 
opposition for unitization policies must be examined in more detail. 
The theoretical discussion in Section II provides the basis for separat- 
16 Subunits include those found on the Slaughter field with 28 units (Oil and Gas 
Journal, April 15, 1963); the Scurry Reef field units of Sharon Ridge, Diamond M, and 
SACROC (Oil and Gas Journal, August 1, 1960); as well as numerous units on the 
Wasson, Levelland, Seeligson, and Goldsmith fields (Oil and GasJournal, March 3, 1965; 
April 12, 1954; November 11, 1957; November 22, 1965). Indeed, by 1971, 
310,000,000 barrels or 26 percent of Texas production came from the 15 largest 
subunits. Additionally, analysis of detailed company records of the unitization of seven 
Texas fields reveals all seven to be incompletely unitized. 
17 Two articles on the West Cement and Velma Simms reservoirs pointed to use by 
the Corporation Commission of the compulsory unit statute to force parties into the 
units (Oil and Gas Journal, May 19, 1952; November 24, 1958). Further, analysis of 
company records on the unitization of 11 Oklahoma reservoirs shows that while negoti- 
ations were lengthy, once the required 63 percent agreement was reached, the Corpo- 
ration Commission approved the unit. Of the 11 unit files, 10 included discussions of a 
lack of unanimous agreement and corresponding use of the compulsory statute to force 
the unit. 
18 Unit files from Bureau of Land Management, North Central Region, Casper; and 
company records, Denver. 
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ing the firms that would favor or resist early field unitization and 
policies to promote it. That discussion shows that property rights to 
field rents can be fundamentally altered through the unit allocation 
formula. Hence, a firm's stand on compulsory unitization rules to 
break private contracting deadlocks depends on its preunitization 
property rights to oil and how it views unitization will affect them. If 
the firm expects that its share of unitized field rents under the alloca- 
tion rule is less than its share of nonunitized field production, it will 
resist policies to coerce joining. These concerns are most likely to 
affect small firms, and the sources of their opposition depend on the 
stage of production. 
A. Political Opposition and Support for Unitization 
Regulation 
We argued above that during exploration unitization agreements can 
be completed with little discord. Since reservoir information is lim- 
ited, firms do not have any ex ante expected advantages from natural 
geological conditions. A simple sharing rule based on surface acreage 
is then possible. This smooth agreement will not occur, however, if 
there are regulatory advantages provided by state agencies to particu- 
lar firms that could be undone by the unit sharing rule. Indeed, in 
Oklahoma and Texas that was the case. Libecap and Wiggins (1984) 
show that prorationing rules adopted in Oklahoma and Texas in the 
1930s to allocate production were designed explicitly to favor small 
firms. While both states had minimum well-spacing rules, small lease 
owners were given routine exemptions, particularly in Texas. More- 
over, the quota or prorationing rules heavily weighted wells, so that 
there were more wells and higher output levels per acre allowed on 
small leases than on large ones. Small firms lobbied for these favor- 
able rules and worked to maintain them. Compulsory unitization 
legislation, such as that used on federal lands, would have precluded 
the prorationing advantage of small firms, since unit sharing was on 
the basis of proven acreage. 
In addition to these regulation-imposed advantages, small lease 
owners had other reasons for opposing compulsory unitization after 
field development. At that time differences in public and private 
value estimates blocked private agreement on unit shares. The most 
productive, long-lived leases have the greatest uncertainty regarding 
value and, hence, are most likely to be considered by owners to be 
undervalued by public information and the allocation formula. 
Larger firms, disadvantaged on one lease or on one field by unitiza- 
tion, will nonetheless internalize much of the aggregate gains from 
widespread agreements, so they will support compulsory unitization 
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regulation. Small firms, on the other hand, with limited but produc- 
tive leases will not have these offsetting effects and will oppose com- 
pulsory unitization of established fields. A majority-imposed alloca- 
tion rule and forced minority joinder clearly can make small firms 
worse off by reassigning property rights to field rents. Accordingly, 
any government policies to promote unitization when private agree- 
ments fail will depend critically on the political power of small firms. 
B. Small Firms and Compulsory Unitization Efforts on 
Federal Lands and in Oklahoma and Texas 
The federal government was able to adopt its comparatively efficient 
policies with no recorded political opposition for two reasons: (i) there 
were relatively fewer small firms and leases on federal lands, and (ii) 
small firms on federal lands had less influence on policy than did the 
numerous small firms in Oklahoma or Texas. The number of small 
firms on federal lands was limited because leases were typically large. 
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 allowed individual leases of up to 
2,560 acres for prospecting and 640 acres for production. Firms 
could hold multiple leases for a total of 246,080 acres in each state, 
but that limit was relaxed if the acreage was unitized. The federal 
government reserved the mineral rights underlying its land and is- 
sued large leases because it did not gain from strategic drilling, which 
was practiced on private land as firms tried to encourage oil flow to 
their leases. On private lands in Oklahoma and Texas, however, lease 
size was determined by land ownership, which was much more frag- 
mented, and landowners often further divided their lands into multi- 
ple leases to encourage rapid production and drainage. The result 
was that very small leases were common in Oklahoma and Texas. To 
illustrate, on the Oklahoma City field in 1930 there were approxi- 
mately 85 leases of less than 50 acres, 111 leases of between 50 and 
350 acres, and only one of 640 acres (Oil Weekly, September 25, 1930). 
The East Texas field was even more fragmented with many leases 
under 5 acres. Accordingly there were fewer small firms that 
benefited from favorable prorationing rules on federal lands than in 
Oklahoma or Texas. Moreover, those firms had comparatively little 
influence on federal policy since federal lands represented only a 
small portion of total U.S. oil production in the 1930s. In 1936, for 
instance, federal lands accounted for just 3 percent of U.S. produc- 
tion, and most of that came from large leases (American Petroleum 
Inst. 1971, p. 118). Further, the larger federal political process was 
more costly to influence for small, scattered firms on federal lands 
than for small firms in Oklahoma or Texas in lobbying for state 
policies. 
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Unitization policies were first added in 1930 as an amendment to 
the Mineral Leasing Act. It was passed in response to rapid extraction 
and competitive production on the North Dome Kettleman Hills field 
of California, one of the largest fields on federal land. Competitive 
extraction was reducing federal royalty income on Kettleman Hills 
and prospects elsewhere on federal lands (Oil and Gas Journal, July 3, 
1930). 
This smooth adoption of unitization was not repeated in either 
Oklahoma or Texas, where.small lease owners were more prevalent 
than on federal lands. Small firms resisted private unitization agree- 
ments and were the core of opposition to regulations promoting uniti- 
zation. The conflict between large and small firms over unitization 
was based on both information problems and prorationing rules that 
allowed greater production per acre for small lease owners than for 
large firms. Prorationing rules favoring small firms resulted from 
their intense political pressure on the legislatures and regulatory 
agencies in Oklahoma and Texas. To limit drainage and general 
losses from dense drilling, large firms responded by lobbying for 
minimum well-spacing rules, forced pooling of leases, and compul- 
sory unitization. Forced pooling allowed small leases to be con- 
solidated into larger tracts for drilling to reduce well densities. 
Oklahoma adopted formal minimum well-spacing rules and com- 
pulsory lease pooling in 1935 and 1941, respectively (American Bar 
Assoc. 1938, pp. 209-10; Meyers 1967, p. 312). Spacing and compul- 
sory pooling resulted in relatively uniform drilling on new fields and 
narrowed the advantages of small leases to only those arising from 
their natural position on the reservoir. Those policies, in turn, tended 
to reduce opposition to compulsory unitization in Oklahoma. Com- 
pulsory unitization legislation, supported by the Mid Continent Oil 
and Gas Association, an organization of large firms, was unsuccess- 
fully introduced in both 1941 and 1943. A bill finally was passed in 
1945. It required, however, that 85 percent of the leases approve 
unitization before the remainder could be forced to join. It also ex- 
empted all fields discovered 20 years prior to the act's enactment and, 
more important, allowed unitization only on fully developed reser- 
voirs (1945 Oklahoma Sess. Laws at 162). Those provisions reflected 
the opposition of small firms, who feared losing their strategic advan- 
tage because of either dense drilling and preferential prorationing 
rules or limited information on lease characteristics. Immediately af- 
ter passage of the 1945 law, two major Oklahoma fields, West Ed- 
mond Hunton Lime and West Cement Medrano, were unitized by the 
Corporation Commission. Resistance to forced unitization on these 
fields led to unsuccessful efforts to repeal the law in 1947 and a 
subsequent state supreme court test (American Bar Assoc. 1949, p. 
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400). The intensity of repeal efforts, which resulted in floor votes in 
both houses of the Oklahoma legislature, underscores the importance 
of strategic advantages and information problems. The opposition is 
all the more striking when the aggregate gains from unitization are 
considered. With unit management West Cement Medrano output 
increased by 70,000 barrels or $180,000 per day by 1951 compared to 
levels that would have been obtained without unitization. The incre- 
mental output resulted simply from plugging high gas/oil ratio wells, 
producing all output from low ratio wells, and recycling produced gas 
back into the reservoir instead of selling it (Oklahoma Corporation 
Comm., West Cement Medrano files). By 1951 opposition to the 
Oklahoma compulsory unitization statute was largely spent, and the 
original law was amended with little controversy to lower the required 
majority for forced units from 85 to 63 percent (1951 Oklahoma Sess. 
Laws at 136). 
In Texas there was more opposition by small firms to regulatory 
change for wider well spacing, forced pooling of leases, and compul- 
sory unitization than in Oklahoma. There were widespread exemp- 
tions to spacing rules, particularly on the East Texas field, that gave 
advantages to small leases. Forced pooling of leases did not pass until 
1965, 24 years after Oklahoma, and even then, it only followed court 
rulings that outlawed some preferential quotas for small tracts. 
Significantly, compulsory unitization was never enacted. Voluntary 
units formed in Texas could be only for secondary recovery or pres- 
sure maintenance. The relative success of large firms in Oklahoma in 
securing spacing, pooling, and unitization legislation was due to a 
lower incidence of small firms compared with Texas. Available evi- 
dence suggests that in 1930 the average Texas producer was only 63 
percent of the size of the average Oklahoma producer. '9 This differ- 
ence in the incidence of small firms was exacerbated by the late 1930 
discovery of East Texas. Within three years there were 1,000 primar- 
ily new firms on East Texas, three times as many as were reported for 
all of Oklahoma in 1930. By 1948 there were approximately 3,400 
small, independent producers in Texas, with many of them located 
on the East Texas field (American Bar Assoc. 1949, p. 448). Further, 
because of the influence of small producers East Texas was prorated 
on a per well basis, while other Texas fields generally had quotas 
based on 50 percent acreage and 50 percent wells. The benefits re- 
ceived by small firms on East Texas from the prorationing rule are 
19 This excludes the 10 largest firms in both states. Data are based on production 
reports in Oil Weekly (March 20, 1931). Comprehensive data were not available for 
Oklahoma for the very small firms, those with output less than $5,000, and those firms 
were not used in calculations. 
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reflected in their drilling practices. By 1933 small firms averaged one 
well per 9 acres, while the 24 largest firms averaged one well per 14 
acres. Hence, small East Texas operators, in particular, had an incen- 
tive to resist wide spacing, pooling, and unitization efforts. 
The Railroad Commission set maximum well densities but rou- 
tinely granted exemptions to small lease owners.20 Dense drilling fol- 
lowed. A 1-acre lot in Kilgore had 27 producing wells, and 1-acre 
tracts with five to 10 wells were common (American Bar Assoc. 1949, 
p. 493). Between 1938 and 1948 of the 100 well-spacing exemption 
cases heard by appellate courts in Texas, 99 concerned East Texas 
(American Bar Assoc. 1949, pp. 489-90). As late as 1959 the Railroad 
Commission did not formulate well-spacing rules until 18 months 
after a new field's discovery, sufficient time to allow narrow spacing 
practices to become established (Oil and Gas Journal, May 1, 1959). 
Both dense drilling and allowables per well provided small Texas 
firms with strategic advantages. Hence, they opposed regulatory 
changes that would weaken their ability to drain. Compulsory lease 
pooling efforts were resisted by the Texas Independent Producers 
and Royalty Owners Association (TIPRO), an organization of small 
firms (TIPRO Reporter, February 1949). Moreover, TIPRO helped 
block changes in prorationing rules from a per well to an acreage 
basis (TIPRO Reporter, September/October 1950). Preferential alloca- 
tions to small lease owners continued through 1962, when quotas per 
well were finally overturned in two court cases, Atlantic Refining Co. et 
al. v. Railroad Commission (346 S.W.2d, 801 [1961]) and Halbouty v. 
Railroad Commission (357 S.W.2d, 364 [1962]). After those rulings, 
bills were quickly introduced in the Texas legislature to subsidize 
small lease drilling. While they failed, their consideration illustrates 
the political power of small firms (Oil and Gas Journal, May 8, 1961). 
Voluntary unitization legislation was introduced in the legislature 
in 1947, but it failed because of opposition by TIPRO and other small 
firm groups (Oil and Gas Journal, June 14, 1947; TIPRO Reporter, 
December 1948). In 1949 a new voluntary unitization bill was in- 
troduced, and it was passed only after the unanimity rule was 
strengthened and provisions inserted to protect nonsigners if por- 
tions of fields were unitized (Oil and Gas Journal, June 2, 1949). There 
were repeated efforts to enact a compulsory unitization bill for the 
next 26 years, but they failed in the face of entrenched opposition by 
small oil producers. 
This analysis of the political environment for unitization reveals 
20 This was to allow all property owners access to the oil beneath their land. Granting 
sufficient oil to cover costs also allowed small firms to legally drain neighboring areas 
when oil below their lease was limited. 
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that the same small, strategically located firms that resisted private 
agreement also molded policy responses. In Texas, small landowners 
and firms were numerous and influential, particularly because of the 
East Texas field, and, as compared to Oklahoma's experience, they 
successfully delayed spacing, compulsory pooling, and prorationing 
rules that would have facilitated unitization. Their influence blocked 
compulsory unitization statutes and led to administrative practices 
where units could be approved only for pressure maintenance and 
secondary recovery. In Oklahoma small firms were less politically 
powerful, and the state's early spacing and pooling regulations lim- 
ited strategic advantages to small leases from prorationing rules. 
While small firms could not prevent enactment of a compulsory unit 
law, their opposition did lead to exemption of old fields and to a 
requirement that only fully developed fields be unitized. The record 
in Oklahoma, however, shows that the compulsory provision was 
commonly used to force holdouts into units. In Texas, on the other 
hand, fragmented units or subunits were common owing to the una- 
nimity rule. In contrast to either Oklahoma or Texas, federal policy 
was adopted with no evidence of political opposition. Because of the 
larger size of federal leases, there were fewer small firms than in 
Oklahoma or Texas, and their political influence on federal policy 
was smaller. Moreover, among the three government agencies there 
were differing incentives for promoting unitization. As landowner 
the federal government benefited directly from more efficient pro- 
duction, since it received both lease bonuses and royalty payments. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the breakdown of private contracting and the 
regulatory response to efforts to unitize oil fields. The incentive to 
contract lies in avoiding rent dissipation associated with common-pool 
crude oil production. The potential aggregate gains from unitized, 
single-firm production are large: extraction rates can more fully con- 
sider user costs and follow rent-maximizing patterns; capital costs can 
be reduced through elimination of excessive wells and surface stor- 
age; and total oil recovery can be increased since subsurface pressures 
can be better maintained through controlled oil withdrawal. Private 
unit negotiations typically fail, nevertheless, because of lease 
heterogeneities and associated information problems regarding esti- 
mates of lease values and holdout strategies. Consensus cannot be 
reached on net profit shares based on the estimated contribution of 
individual leases to unit production. These contracting problems be- 
come apparent once development has proceeded sufficiently to reveal 
the sharp differences in production capacities and rents across leases. 
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The regulatory policies on federal lands surmount these informa- 
tion problems by encouraging unitization prior to development. In 
Oklahoma and Texas, however, unitization can occur only when 
fields are fully developed. Successful negotiation requires compensa- 
tion to reflect strategic advantages, once lease heterogeneities are es- 
tablished. Uncertainty and information asymmetries regarding lease 
values block agreement on the compensation that must be paid. 
Hence, unitization occurs much less often in Oklahoma or Texas than 
on federal lands, though Oklahoma's compulsory unit law results in 
more unitized production than in Texas. Additionally, Wyoming and 
Oklahoma laws avoid fragmented or multiple units, which are com- 
mon in Texas. 
More generally, our analysis suggests that policy approaches to con- 
tracting problems must concentrate on agreement early, before infor- 
mation advantages lead to differential rents to holdouts. Our study of 
unitization contracting suggests that when private contracts fail as a 
result of information asymmetries among firms or, hypothetically, 
among consumers and firms, regulatory policies may not yield an 
efficient solution because of political opposition from vested interests. 
Where such political opposition is influential, regulatory assistance to 
facilitate contracts may not be forthcoming, as in Texas, or limited, as 
in Oklahoma. The federal lands case is of general interest because 
federal policies are effective and, apparently, relatively independent 
of the political influence of small firms that were influential in Okla- 
homa and Texas. These observations raise doubt about government's 
ability to enact policies to increase efficiency when there are serious 
redistributive consequences and the groups harmed are a major polit- 
ical force. 
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